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Executive Summary
Trust is a key factor in the effectiveness of the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) service, formerly known as the Commercial Mobile Alert Service (CMAS). Alert originators (AOs) working at emergency management agencies (EMAs) must trust WEA to deliver alerts to the public in an accurate and timely manner. Absent this trust, AOs will not use WEA. Members of the public must also trust the WEA service. They must understand and believe the messages that they receive before they will act on them. Clearly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the EMAs, and the AOs must all strive to maximize and maintain trust in the WEA service if it is to be an effective alerting tool.
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) tasked the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI) with developing a WEA trust model. The purpose of this model was to provide data that would enable FEMA to maximize the effectiveness of WEA and provide guidance for AOs that would support them in using WEA in a manner that maximized public safety. This effort resulted in two separate models: a public trust model to examine the degree of trust that the public will have in the WEA system and the resulting alerts and an AO trust model to examine the degree of trust that AOs will have in the WEA system. Section 1 overviews the models.
We used Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) to model trust in WEA. The BBN provides a way to describe complex probabilistic reasoning in a graphical format, and its main use is in situations that require statistical inference. A key feature of BBNs is that they enable modeling and reasoning about uncertainty. The BBN forces the assessor to expose all assumptions about the impact of different forms of evidence, so it provides a visible and auditable dependability or safety argument. We developed the two trust models using AgenaRisk, Version 6.0, a commercial software application suited for BBN modeling. Section 2 details the procedures used to run simulations on the trust models with this application.
For each trust model, we ran four types of simulations. Single-factor simulations focused on assessing the sensitivity of the 20 individual factors identified in the public trust model. Multifactor simulations investigated interactions between combinations of factors within and across groups of factors. Random-input simulations used stochastic samples of input variables. Special-case simulations addressed specific combinations of inputs variables determined to drive the model outputs to extreme values. Sections 3 and 4 include the simulations run on each factor and group of factors investigated.
The purpose of the trust model and the multitude of simulation runs is to identify factors and practices that enhance or degrade trust. The analysis process had two goals: to identify those simulations that predicted the highest levels of trust and those simulations that predicted the lowest levels of trust. Section 5 includes the steps of this analysis process and the results for each trust model.
The public and AO trust models are available for download at the following URLs: Those wishing to run their own simulations and study trust factors in their own contexts of emergency alerting may download them from there.
Abstract
Trust is a key factor in the effectiveness of the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) service. Alert originators must trust WEA to deliver alerts to the public in an accurate and timely manner. Members of the public must also trust the WEA service before they will act on the alerts that they receive. This research aimed to develop a trust model to enable the Federal Emergency Management Agency to maximize the effectiveness of WEA and provide guidance for alert originators that would support them in using WEA in a manner that maximizes public safety. This report overviews the public trust model and the alert originator trust model. The research method included Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) to model trust in WEA because they enable reasoning about and modeling of uncertainty. The report details the procedures used to run simulations on the trust models. For each trust model, single-factor, multifactor, random-input, and special-case simulations were run on each factor and group of factors investigated. The analysis of the simulations had two goals: to identify those simulations that predicted the highest levels of trust and those simulations that predicted the lowest levels of trust. This report includes the results for each trust model.
Introduction
Overview of the Wireless Emergency Alerts
The Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) service, formerly known as the Commercial Mobile Alert Service (CMAS), enhances public safety by providing authorized emergency management agencies (EMAs) with the capability to issue alerts and warnings to mobile communication devices (e.g., cell phones) in a designated geographic area. WEA is a component of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) operated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in cooperation with the Federal Communications Commission and supported by the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T).
WEA messages may be initiated by authorized national, state, local, tribal, and territorial EMAs. Three categories of WEA messages may be sent: 1. Presidential -Only the president of the United States may issue a Presidential Alert. This message enables the president to alert or warn a specific region or the nation as a whole of an event of critical importance.
2. Imminent Threat -EMAs may issue alerts to specific geographic areas affected by an immediate or expected threat of extreme or severe consequences. Threats may arise from a number of sources, including weather conditions (e.g., tornadoes, flash floods), law enforcement actions (e.g., riots, gunfire), fires, and environmental hazards (e.g., chemical spills, gas releases).
3. Americas Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) -EMAs may issue AMBER Alerts for missing or abducted children.
WEA messages are initiated by the EMAs and transmitted to the IPAWS Open Platform for Emergency Networks (IPAWS-OPEN) system using the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) format. After authentication and verification, IPAWS-OPEN processes the WEA message and sends it to the commercial mobile service providers (CMSPs). The CMSPs broadcast the alert from cell towers in the designated geographic area to all compatible cellular devices. The cellular devices produce a distinctive ringtone, vibration pattern, or both and display the WEA message.
Trust Models for the Wireless Emergency Alerts
Trust is a key factor in the effectiveness of the WEA service. Alert originators (AOs) working at EMAs must trust WEA to deliver alerts to the public in an accurate and timely manner. Absent this trust, AOs will not use WEA. Members of the public must also trust the WEA service. They must understand and believe the messages that they receive before they will act on them. Clearly, FEMA, the EMAs, and the AOs must all strive to maximize and maintain trust in the WEA service if it is to be an effective alerting tool.
In 2012, DHS S&T tasked the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI) with developing a WEA trust model. The purpose of this model was to provide data that would enable FEMA to maximize the effectiveness of WEA and provide guidance for AOs that would support them in using WEA in a manner that maximized public safety. At a high level, our approach to this task was to build models that could predict the levels of AO trust and public trust in specific scenarios, validate these models using data collected from AOs and the public, and execute simulations on these models to identify recommendations to AOs and FEMA. We built two separate models: 1. a public trust model to examine the degree of trust that the public will have in the WEA system and the resulting alerts 2. an AO trust model to examine the degree of trust that AOs will have in the WEA system
We executed simulations on these models for numerous scenarios to identify both recommendations to AOs and FEMA for actions to take that increase trust and for actions to avoid that decrease trust.
Results of this work consist of  Wireless Emergency Alerts: Trust Model Technical Report, a detailed technical report describing the process employed in the development and validation of the trust models and the resulting structure and functionality of the models [Stoddard 2013 ]  a technical report (this report) detailing the scenarios and simulations executed on the trust models  Maximizing Trust in the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) Service, a nontechnical report analyzing the results of the simulations and identifying trust-enhancing practices to be employed and trust-degrading processes to be avoided by both AOs and FEMA [Woody 2013] Note that this report presents only the results of the trust model simulations. It does not attempt to interpret them. For interpretation, see the Maximizing Trust in the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) Service report.
Bayesian Belief Models
A Bayesian belief network (BBN) is a way of describing complex probabilistic reasoning via a graphical format. The main use of BBNs is in situations that require statistical inference. A BBN is a directed graph, together with an associated set of probability tables [Fenton 2008 ]. The graph consists of nodes and arcs. The nodes represent variables, which can be discrete or continuous. The arcs represent causal or influential relationships between variables. Figure 1 shows a simple example.
Figure 1: Example of a Directed Graph
Weather forecast Umbrella order
Sunglasses order
This example examines the sales of two stores, Superior Sunglass Sales (SSS) and Rainy Day Umbrellas (RDU).

Both SSS and RDU receive their supplies from Ajax Distributing Company.
When the weather forecast is favorable, sales of sunglasses increase. On 70% of those sunny days, SSS places orders for sunglasses with Ajax. But on rainy days, sunglass sales decrease, and SSS places orders with Ajax on only 20% of those days.
When the weather forecast is unfavorable, sales of umbrellas increase. On 90% of those rainy days, RDU places orders for umbrellas with Ajax. But on sunny days, umbrella sales decrease, and RDU places orders with Ajax on only 10% of those days.  Sunny days outnumber rainy days 7 to 3.
We can summarize this information in several node probability tables, as shown in Table 1 . Given this information, we can use Bayesian statistics to make some inferences and predictions. For example, the overall probability that Ajax will receive an order from SSS is the combination of probabilities for sunny and rainy days:
Likewise, the probability that RDU will place an order is ( _ ) = (0.7 * 0.1) + (0.3 * 0.9) = 0.34
We can now apply the Bayes theorem to examine some resulting relationships. The Bayes theorem states, From Table 1 , we know the probabilities of an SSS order and an RDU order in the event of a sunny forecast:
Using the Bayes theorem, we reverse this and calculate the probability that there is a sunny forecast if we know that SSS has placed an order:
In this example, we initially believed that the probability of a sunny forecast was 70%. However, faced with the additional evidence that SSS has placed an order, we can update our belief to recognize that the probability of a sunny forecast is now 91%.
With this new knowledge, we can take this analysis further. We can calculate the probability that RDU will place an order, given the observation that SSS has placed an order.
Again, we initially believed that the probability of receiving an order from RDU was 34%. But given the evidence that Ajax has received an SSS order, we can update our belief to a 17% chance that Ajax will receive an RDU order.
The key feature of BBNs is that they enable us to model and reason about uncertainty. The BBN forces the assessor to expose all assumptions about the impact of different forms of evidence and hence provides a visible and auditable dependability or safety argument.
Public Trust Model
The public trust model examines the interaction of factors that influence the public's trust in the WEA service and the alerts issued through it. Through research of public alerting literature and discussions with experts in the field of public alerting, we identified the factors contributing to trust and their interactions. Figure 2 shows the results of these efforts in a directed graph, in which arrows show the relationships between factors.
Figure 2: WEA Public BBN Expanded
We quantified the relationships between these factors through surveys and validated them with interviews of representatives of the public. We captured the results in a BBN implemented on AgenaRisk, a commercial platform suited for BBN modeling. For details about the creation of the model and the BBN, see the Wireless Emergency Alerts: Trust Model Technical Report [Stoddard 2013 ]. Table 2 and Table 3 show the model inputs and outputs, respectively. 
Alert Originator Trust Model
The AO trust model examines the interaction of factors that influence the AO's trust in the WEA service. We identified the factors contributing to trust and their interactions through research of public alerting literature and discussions with AOs. Figure 3 shows the results of these efforts in a directed graph, in which arrows show the relationships between factors.
Figure 3: WEA Alert Originator BBN
Similarly to the public trust model, we quantified the relationships between these factors through surveys and validated them with interviews of AOs. We captured the results in a BBN implemented on AgenaRisk. For details about the creation of the model and the BBN, see the Wireless Emergency Alerts: Trust Model Technical Report [Stoddard 2013 ]. Table 4 and Table 5 show the model inputs and outputs, respectively. 
Appropriateness
The degree to which WEA provides an alerting solution that is appropriate to the event  Urgency
The degree of immediacy associated with an event is consistent with WEA usage  Severity
The degree of impact associated with an event is consistent with WEA usage  Certainty
The verifiability of the associated event is sufficient to justify a WEA message  Geographic breadth
The size and location of the geographic region impacted by the emergency event is consistent with WEA capabilities  Time of day
The time of day (e.g., waking hours, middle of the night) when the alert is to be issued  Responsibility
The AO's obligation and authority to issue the alert (i.e., is it clear that the responsibility and authority to issue the alert resides with the AO, or could some other organizations be responsible for issuing the alert?) The availability of predefined formats and information to accelerate and ease the process of alert issuance  Training Creation of skills, competencies, and knowledge for AOs  Skills/competencies
The aptitude and capability to operate the WEA service effectively  Understanding
The knowledge of the operational characteristics of the WEA service  Practice
The exercising of skills needed to operate the WEA service effectively  Security
The degree of confidence that the WEA service is robust against attempted cyber attacks (e.g., spoofing, tampering, and denial-of-service attacks)
Effectiveness
The degree to which the WEA service accomplishes its intended purpose  System feedback
The quality and value of information describing system function that is provided by the WEA service to the AO  Real-time system feedback Information from the WEA service reporting the status of the current WEA message dissemination process (e.g., message delivered, message rejected)  Historical system feedback Information from the WEA service regarding prior performance (e.g., dissemination time, alert geolocation data)  Public feedback history Information received from the public regarding prior WEA messages (e.g., "thanks for warning me," "don't wake me at night")  After-action review data Knowledge resulting from in-house review and analysis of prior WEA message disseminations  Timeliness
The ability of the WEA service to disseminate a WEA message within a suitable time frame  Message understandability
The ability to convey necessary information within the constraints of the WEA message  Accuracy
The ability of the WEA system to disseminate correct alert information to intended recipients  Message accuracy
The ability of the WEA service to disseminate alerts with the message content intended by the AO  Location accuracy
The ability of the WEA service to disseminate alerts to the defined locations  Public awareness/outreach
The establishment of prior awareness and public education regarding WEA services  Alert frequency
The number of WEA messages issued within an area in the immediate past 
Appropriateness
The degree to which WEA provides an alerting solution that is appropriate to the event
Availability
The degree to which the WEA service is capable of being used when needed to issue an alert
Effectiveness
The degree to which the WEA service accomplishes its intended purpose
WEA utilization
The degree to which the AO is willing to use the WEA service
We developed the two trust models using the application AgenaRisk, Version 6.0. To eliminate the need for future users to purchase or subscribe to this software, we configured the models to run on a free version of the software application-AgenaRisk Free. This version of the application has some limitations not found in the commercial version, as shown in Table 6 . However, for purposes of running these models, these limitations do not apply. The models can be run on AgenaRisk Free using the following procedure: 1. Access http://www.agenarisk.com/products/free_download.shtml 2. Select the Windows version for download: AgenaRisk_6_0_Free_Release_1312_ win32bit.exe 3. Download and review the README file for AgenaRisk, which is also on the same web page.
4. Install the application following the instructions in the README file.
5. Start the AgenaRisk application.
6. Load either of the two models by clicking File and then clicking Open Model.
a. The public trust model is WEA Public BBN-v030.
b. The alert originator trust model is WEA AO BBN-v090.
7. After the model is loaded, the application displays the model's risk map. Use the mouse to click the Risk Table. 8. For ease in configuring the inputs, order the risk objects in the same order as they appear in the simulation spreadsheet. 11. Enter the simulation inputs for the scenarios based on the definitions contained in the simulation files. Note that no answer or a blank in a cell will cause the simulation to use a uniformly distributed probability for the risk object.
12. Because the simulations were run with inputs set at known values-or either 0%, 100%, or uniformly distributed between these values-input and output risk graphs are not of interest, so click Risk Graphs, and then click Close All Graphs.
13. Run the simulation by clicking the Run Calculation button.
14.
When the simulation has completed, select the appropriate output risk objects to view their risk graphs and obtain the median value.
Public Trust Model Simulations
Defining Simulation Scenarios
The public trust model includes 20 input factors. For the simulations, we evaluated these factors in three states: 1. 0% probability -The factor is absent for the simulation.
2. 100% probability -The factor is present for the simulation.
3. Uniformly distributed probability between 0% and 100% -We assert no knowledge of the absence or presence of the factor for the simulation.
Evaluating all combinations of all factors in all states would require 3 20 (>3 billion) simulation runs-clearly an unreasonable amount. To circumvent this combinatorial explosion, we chose to group the factors in five categories, as shown in We could now simplify our investigations to examine the interactions between these five groups and the interactions within each group. To bring these interactions into focus, we ran three types of simulations: single factor simulations, multifactor simulations, and random simulations.
Single-Factor Simulations
The single-factor simulation efforts focused on assessing the sensitivity of the 20 individual factors identified in the public trust model. For each factor in each category, we configured a simulation run in which we set the factor under analysis to 0% probability and set all the other factors to uniform probability distribution. Next, we repeated this process with each factor set to 100% probability rather than 0%.
These single-factor simulations supported the assessment of the individual impact of each factor.
Multifactor Simulations
Multifactor simulations investigated interactions between combinations of factors within and across the groups noted in Table 7 . For example, the Confirmation category has three factors (037_Confirmation via social media, 015_Easy additional follow-us mechanisms, and 044_Redundancy of alerting). Using a factorial design approach, we treated each factor as an independent variable. Since there are three factors and two levels (0% and 100%), the design would have 2 or eight different experimental conditions or runs. Using the factorial design to consider the Message Characteristics category with its eight factors would require 2 or 256 runs to account for the all variations.
To address the exponential growth when the number of factors increases, statisticians have developed the fractional factorial design, which involves a simple fraction (e.g., ½ or ¼) of the experimental conditions in a corresponding factorial design [Penn State 2012] . The fractional factorial design takes advantage of redundancies observed in the factorial design to reduce the number of runs needed. Through the use of a balance property, in which every level of a factor appears the same number of times at every level of each of the other factors, fractional factorial design very closely approximates the results of a factorial design in an efficient manner because the lower order effects in the factorial design are estimated [Wu 2009 ]. A 2 design is a fractional factorial design with k factors, each at two levels, consisting of 2 runs. This means that it is a (2 p )th fraction of the 2 full factorial design in which the fraction is determined by p defining words, and a "word" consists of letters that are the names of the factors denoted by 1, 2, … , k. A side effect of using fractional factorial designs is the consequence of aliasing of factorial effects. See Wu and Hamada's work for further details [Wu 2009 ].
Since the Preparation category has only one factor, the single-factor simulations covered all of its experimental conditions. For the other four categories in the public trust model, Table 8 through Table 11 show the multifactor simulation runs. Each table represents one factor grouping from 7, with the factors internal to the grouping established using Plackett-Burman fractional factorial designs [Giesbrecht 2004 ]. We used a commercial statistical software application to select the fractional factorial designs that would ensure coverage of the factor space and provide results containing the greatest possible amount of information. In Table 8 through Table 11 , the table titles identify the fractional factorial design selected, where resolution indicates the interactions among the main factors and the lower level factors. For each category, we executed one run for each experimental condition identified in its associated table. In that run, we set the factors from other categories to uniform probability distribution. 
Random-Input Simulations
For the public trust model, we ran 27 simulations with inputs randomly set to either 0%, 100%, or a uniform probability distribution between these values (Runs 73-100), as shown in Table 12 . We used stochastic, or probabilistic, simulations, in which one or more input variables are random. A stochastic simulation produces output that is itself random and therefore gives only one data point indicating how the system might behave. 
U 0 Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution.
Special-Case Input Simulations
In the last set of simulations with the public trust model, we ran seven special cases involving the inputs shown in Table 13 . These simulations were defined to drive the model outputs to extreme values. Table 14 shows the results of the previously defined 107 simulation runs. The primary outputs of the model are the following nodes:
Simulation Results
The values in Table 14 represent the likelihood of the truth of the output. So a value of 48 for 100_Hearing represents a 48% likelihood that a member of the public in the area receiving the alert will hear it. 
Defining Simulation Scenarios
The AO trust model includes 26 input factors. For the simulations, we evaluated these factors in three states: 1. 0% probability -The factor is absent for the simulation.
3. Uniformly distributed probability between 0% and 100% -We have no knowledge of the absence or presence of the factor for the simulation.
Evaluating all combinations of all factors in all states would require 3 26 (>2.5 trillion simulation runs-clearly an unreasonable amount. To circumvent this combinatorial explosion, we chose to group the factors in nine categories, as shown in We could now simplify our investigations to examine the interactions between these nine groups and the interactions within each group. To bring these interactions into focus, we ran four types of simulations: single-factor simulations, multifactor simulations, random simulations, and specialcase simulations.
Single-Factor Simulations
The initial simulation efforts focused on assessing the sensitivity of the 26 individual factors identified in the AO trust model. For each factor in each category, we configured a simulation run in which we set the factor under analysis to 0% probability and set all the other factors to uniform probability distribution. Next, we repeated this process with each factor set to 100% probability rather than 0%.
Multifactor Simulations
Multifactor simulations investigated interactions between combinations of factors within and across the groups noted in Table 15 . For the AO trust model, we used the fractional factorial design, as shown in Table 16 through Table 21 . 
Random-Input Simulations
For the AO trust model, we ran 68 simulations with inputs randomly set to either 0%, 100%, or a uniform probability distribution between these values (Runs 93-160), as shown in Table 22 . We used stochastic, or probabilistic, simulations, in which one or more input variables are random. A stochastic simulation produces output that is itself random and therefore gives only one data point indicating how the system might behave.
CMU/SEI-2013-SR-026 | 24 5 Analysis of Simulations
Simulation Results
Analysis Process
The purpose of the trust model and the multitude of simulation runs described previously is to identify factors and practices that enhance or degrade trust. To identify these factors, we analyzed the results of the simulations. In general, our analysis process had two goals: 1. Identify those simulations that predicted the highest levels of trust.

Examine those simulations to identify the input factors that appear most frequently. These represent the actions and practices to promote to maximize trust.
Examine those simulations to identify the input factors that are absent most frequently. These represent the actions and practices to avoid to maximize trust. 2. Identify those simulations that predicted the lowest levels of trust.  Examine those simulations to identify the input factors that appear most frequently. These factors also represent the actions and practices to avoid to maximize trust.  Examine those simulations to identify the input factors that are absent most frequently. These factors represent the actions and practices to promote to maximize trust.
Thus, the factors that enhance trust are those that are most often present in the simulations predicting high levels of trust, and the factors that are most often absent in the simulations predicting low levels of trust. Likewise, the factors that degrade trust are those that are most often present in the simulations predicting low levels of trust, and the factors that are most often absent in the simulations predicting high levels of trust.
Since the models have multiple outputs (e.g., Understanding, Believing, and Acting for the public trust model), we can perform this analysis process for each output to identify those factors that enhance or degrade that output.
Remember that the public trust model responds to input factors as listed in Table 2 and produces outputs as listed in Table 3 . Likewise, the AO trust model responds to input factors as listed in Table 4 and produces outputs as listed in Table 5 . We ran the simulations with input probability values set at 100% (input factor is present), 0% (input factor is absent), or probability uniformly distributed between 0% and 100% (input factor is unknown).
The analysis process used for each of the models consists of the following steps: 1. Choose a model output, and sort all of the simulation runs in decreasing order for that output. For example, sort the simulation runs of the AO trust model such that the runs that produce the highest values for the Utilization factor precede those that produce lower values.
2. Segment this ordered list into three categories of approximately equal size-those that have the highest output values, those that have the middle output values, and those that have the lowest output values. Since the list is ordered, this amounts to categorizing the first third of the list as the highest category, the second third of the list as the middle category, and the last third of the list as the lowest category.
3. For the set of simulations in each category, for each factor, a. note the frequency of presence; that is, count the number of times the factor is present (=100%) b. note the frequency of absence; that is, count the number of times the factor is absent (=0%) 4. Within each category, identify the factors that have the highest frequencies of presence and the factors that have the highest frequencies of absence.
Interpret the results as follows:
a. The factors with the highest frequency of presence in the highest output category represent those factors that enhance trust.
b. The factors with the highest frequency of absence in the highest output category represent those factors that degrade trust.
c. The factors with the highest frequency of presence in the lowest output category represent those factors that degrade trust.
d. The factors with the highest frequency of absence in the lowest output category represent those factors that enhance trust.
6. Repeat the previous four steps for each of the model outputs. Table 25 and Table 26 provide the results we obtained as an outcome of the preceding process. 
Analysis Results
Links to Trust Models
Those wishing to run their own simulations and study trust factors in their own contexts of emergency alerting may download the public and AO trust models at the following URL:
http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=70032
